A gricultural co-operatives have attracted considerably more attention from scientists, particularly economists, in research on collective action in agriculture, than have federations of co-operatives. The wide bibliography on agricultural cooperatives contrasts with the scarcity of such material on the associations (federations) used by the co-operative movement to represent its interests and influence decision-making institutions. 1 This accounts for the lack of interest in federations of agricultural co-operatives, not only in the academic world, but also among farmers, many of whom have little understanding of the role and raison d'être of these claim-oriented associations.
A gricultural co-operatives have attracted considerably more attention from scientists, particularly economists, in research on collective action in agriculture, than have federations of co-operatives. The wide bibliography on agricultural cooperatives contrasts with the scarcity of such material on the associations (federations) used by the co-operative movement to represent its interests and influence decision-making institutions. 1 This accounts for the lack of interest in federations of agricultural co-operatives, not only in the academic world, but also among farmers, many of whom have little understanding of the role and raison d'être of these claim-oriented associations.
Economists have generally analyzed co-operatives from a rational choice point of view, in an attempt to understand their organizational rationale and their role in relation to the market. They have departed from both the formulation of transaction cost and market failure to analyze their external and internal dimensions. Cooperatives have also been analyzed sociologically, as processes of collective action expanding throughout the wider society and thus becoming a significant social phenomenon, regulated in some countries by special laws. Traditionally, while sociologists have emphasized the social function of co-operatives and their non-economic attributes, they have been unable to elaborate a unified view. The Danish sociologist Torben Bager has analyzed the dynamics of co-operatives as formal organizations affected in two dimensions: legitimacy efficiency and context action. He asserts that such dynamics "can only be understood properly through a bridging of rational choice and institutional approaches" 2 (Bager 1996, p. 7) .
Nevertheless, federations of co-operatives act in a political field of interest representation that is frequently influenced by the state through official decision-making institutions. In modern democracies, the state creates or promotes institutional frameworks to channel the participation of organized interest groups in decisionmaking processes. Co-operatives, as one such organized interest group, form federations in order to participate in these institutional frameworks. The state then imposes certain rules on the participants, which both order the field of representation and condition the organizational models. Sociologists, therefore, need to use neo-insti-tutional approaches in order to understand the collective actions and organizational models of federations of co-operatives (Hall and Taylor 1996; Daugbjerg 1997) . 3 In this respect, it can be said that the way in which co-operatives are organized into federations to defend their interests is not a direct result of their preferences as collective actors, but rather the interaction of these preferences with the institutional framework in which they act. In fact, co-operatives act in an instrumental and strategic way to form open issue networks (often a plurality of federations of co-operatives, organized according to activity sector or branch). But when these networks decide to participate in decision-making institutions they become political communities, 4 and the preferences of their members (co-operatives) are, to a great extent, shaped, or even determined, by the rules, principles and procedures of the institutional framework in which they are immersed. This would explain why the trend towards pluralist models of interest representation, which would result from an analysis of the preferences of a co-operative movement marked by internal diversity and heterogeneity, is counteracted by a trend towards unitary models of representation, when federations of co-operatives participate in decisionmaking institutions. That is why we consider it necessary to use an institutionalist approach in order to understand the final result of the process of constituting federations of co-operatives.
In this paper, we shall first analyze federations of co-operatives from a theoretical point of view, as a particular category within the ideal type of claim-oriented associations, which also include farmers' unions. We shall then focus our attention on current discourses, strategies and organizational models in European agricultural co-operativism. Finally, using Spain as an example we discuss the establishment of the Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España (Spanish Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives) (ccae), which represents the interests of agricultural co-operatives in the decision-making institutions. The creation of the unitary ccae can be seen as the final result of a process of reduction of plurality, in which the influence of state institutions has been a very important factor.
Federations of co-operatives as claim-oriented associations
In general, relations between co-operatives are conducted at two levels: at the economic level, where they form second and third tier co-operatives to participate in the market, and at the interest representation level, where they form federations to represent the co-operative movement as a whole. Both levels of collective action, therefore, respond to a different logic: an economic logic in the first, and, in the second, a logic of claims and politics. According to this distinction, federations of co-operatives are claim-oriented associations possessing some features in common with farmers' unions. The main differences between them derive from the fact that the rank and file of federations of co-operatives is formed not by individual farmers, but by farming co-operatives acting collectively.
In this first section, we shall analyze the extent to which federations of co-operatives respond to the ideal type of claim-oriented associations. Three essential features characterize this ideal type: a) integral goals; b) public goods, and c) ideological discourse. Each of these will then be examined, using federations of agricultural co-operatives as a reference. Federations of Co-operatives
Integral goals
When we say that the goals of federations of co-operatives are integral we mean that they represent all the interests of their rank and file, that is, the co-operatives. Problems relating to legislation regulating the co-operative movement, or programmes for the promotion of co-operatives are, therefore, part of their agenda. They are also involved in promoting relations between co-operatives at the economic level, with, for example, the promotion of second tier co-operatives. Furthermore, federations of co-operatives have a role in the inter-mediation processes with other interest groups, as, for instance, in the establishment of agreements with the agri-business sector, and play an active part in political decision-making processes with the government.
The list of interests they defend is open ended, covering the problems of the cooperative movement as a whole. They are prepared to repeat their demands and to include, in their activities on its behalf, new problems facing the co-operative movement. Individual co-operatives have a different logic. Their actions are not claim-oriented and their aims are not integral, but one-sided and limited by legal statutes. Some co-operatives, for example, only develop activities in the marketing of specific products, such as oil, and fruit and vegetables, while others offer important services, such as the joint use of machinery and the collective purchase of fertilizers or pesticides. Although it is usual to find co-operatives developing two or more activities simultaneously, their actions are limited by statute, whereas federations always have an open field.
Public goods
Federations of co-operatives work on behalf not only of their member co-operatives, but also of non-members. They behave, therefore, as a social group, offering public goods, from which no one can be excluded. If, for example, a federation of agricultural co-operatives achieves the reform of legislation regulating the co-operative movement, all agricultural co-operatives will benefit, whether or not they are members of such a federation. This is the so-called 'free-rider' problem, which has been analyzed by Mancur Olson in his works on the process of collective action in groups seeking public goods (Olson 1965) . Since benefits resulting from the activities of a federation of co-operatives are enjoyed by non-members as well as members, federations of co-operatives are compelled to offer selective incentives, such as advisory services, centralized accounting, or information on market trends, to encourage affiliation, if they want to solve the 'free-rider' problem.
Co-operatives, on the contrary, do not offer public goods, but exclusive benefits to their members. In his analysis of agricultural co-operatives, Bager states that they produce "exclusive benefits to the members, which outweigh the risks and burden, imposed in them. . . For farmers, the expectation of exclusive members' benefits has undoubtedly been an important factor, both when they collectively consider the establishment of a co-operative and when individually considering membership of established one" (Bager 1996, p. 39) . Some authors, however, have emphasized the role of co-operatives in a specific market as an important factor in counteracting monopolist market structures, so that the very existence of co-operatives could be considered a public good that affects both members and non-members. In this context, the 'free-rider' problem can also be said to occur in co-operatives, when nonmembers undermine the co-operative venture (Ibid. p. 34).
Ideological discourse
Claim-oriented associations use a particular ideological discourse to interpret the problems of their rank and file. This can be seen clearly in the case of farmers' unions, which have different ways of interpreting farmers' problems and, therefore, different ideologies. These differences reflect the ideological diversity that exists among farmers' unions and the different ways of defining and interpreting the problems faced by farmers. Consequently, the panorama of farmers' unions is marked by a diversity of associations, although such diversity is reduced through the influence of institutional factors, particularly decision-making institutions. In democratic regimes, a unitary association rarely represents the whole farming sector. 5 If we focus on federations of co-operatives, this ideological diversity is more difficult to ascertain, since unitary models of interest representation are more common in the co-operative movement. Although it is still possible to find examples of the old division of the co-operative movement into two or three federations, divided by deep ideological differences, in European countries (such as Italy), the dominant tendency is towards unitary models (Just 1990) , which are, in many cases, the result of mergers between federations with different ideologies. 6 The modern trend towards unitary models of interest representation in co-operativism does not mean that real ideological differences have disappeared, but that they have simply been incorporated within the unitary federations. These federations thus form a kind of super-structure, where different ways of interpreting the problems of co-operatives (ideologies) are channeled through their internal democratic mechanisms. When such mechanisms, however, are incapable of integrating the social and economic differences that exist within member co-operatives, signs of disagreement appear, which can lead to the break up of these unitary models.
Thus, it can be said that the tendency towards diversity, which is an essential characteristic of claim-oriented associations, also exists in federations of co-operatives, but is counteracted internally by an opposite tendency towards unity and the creation of unitary models of representation. The key to understanding this tendency is that rank and file members of federations of co-operatives are collective actors (co-operatives), characterized by increasing ideological diversity. In modern co-operativism, farmers come together through economic rather than ideological affinities, and each co-operative is, therefore, a collective actor, characterized by the ideological diversity of its members. This tendency is reflected in the modern theory of co-operativism, which sees co-operatives as large-scale professional organizations, increasingly rejecting co-operative ideology (Nilsson 1986 , quoted in Bager 1996 .
If ideological diversity is a feature of modern co-operatives, the above effect of institutional factors is expected to be stronger in reducing plurality in the process of establishment of federations of co-operatives, than in the constitution of farmers' unions. This could explain why it is easier to find unitary models of interest representation in the co-operative movement than in farmers' unions. Federations of Co-operatives
Discourses, strategies and organizational models
In the context of the important changes now taking place in the farming and food sector, the main effects on agricultural co-operatives are related to the opening up of the agri-food market. In response, federations of agricultural co-operatives implement different strategies and adopt specific organizational models, according to their ideological discourse. These issues will be analyzed in the next section, using the experience of agricultural co-operativism in the European Union as a reference.
Discourses and strategies
There is a general consensus among federations of agricultural co-operatives in the European Union on the role of co-operativism. Co-operatives are seen as non-profit making societies, based on the principles of the International Co-operative Alliance (ica), of openness, democratic management and mutual solidarity. Their purpose is to maintain or raise the level of farmers' incomes through the development of common activities, such as the collective purchase of inputs, the marketing of agricultural products and the joint use of machinery.
Co-operatives are still seen by their leaders, as they were at the beginning of the cooperative movement, as a joint response by small farmers to the demands of the market. Important differences, however, arise when federations define strategies to improve their position in the changing contemporary context. In our theoretical approach, these differences can be analyzed along a continuum on which two ideal types can be located.
At one pole, there is a 'mutualist' discourse, which champions the traditional identity of co-operativism, and stresses the principles of mutual help and solidarity (to place strict limits on the economic relations between the co-operative and non-members), democratic management (one member, one vote), and the role of co-operatives as associations of workers, against a managerial and profit-oriented logic that considers co-operatives as associations of capital. According to this discourse, federations pose demands, for example for more restrictive legislation to support only those cooperatives that conform to traditional principles and to exclude those that do not. They also promote the creation of small and medium-size co-operatives, which are accessible to their members, and reject macro-co-operative models that encourage the introduction of management formulae based on profitability, at the expense of solidarity.
At the other end of this continuum, there is an 'entrepreneurial' discourse, which sees co-operatives as profit making companies. Federations whose claims are based on this discourse also want reform of the legislation on co-operatives, but, unlike the mutualist-oriented federations, they wish to free co-operatives from the restrictions imposed by traditional principles, so as to equip them for the challenge of economic competition. They advocate, on the one hand, the removal of limitations on transactions with farmers who are not members (thus weakening the principle of solidarity and mutual help) and, on the other, the modification in certain situations of the democratic principle of one member one vote. This would allow farmers to have more than one vote in the assembly depending on their contribution to the capital of the co-operative. They go as far as to propose the abolition of all legislation regulating co-operatives, as in Denmark and the United Kingdom. Some of these federations support the creation of macro-co-operative models in order to take advantage of economies of scale and to enable agricultural co-operatives to compete in the increasingly open market. Similarly, they also promote the establishment of inter-professional structures of agricultural co-operatives and agri-food companies (Table 1) .
The reality of co-operativism is obviously more complex than this, and it is difficult to find a federation of co-operative that responds exclusively to one ideal type. Usually, there is a specific combination of certain elements, although one is dominant. Depending on the combination, a real federation of co-operatives can be placed at a specific locus along the continuum. For example, competitive pressures and internationalizing processes force co-operatives to seek to attract non-farmer investment through conversion to hybrid models, but responses can vary among federations of co-operatives, according to the emphasis on the mutualist or entrepreneurial dimension of their discourse. 7 
Organizational models
The internal organizational models of federations of co-operatives can also be analyzed as ideal types along a continuum, with at one end of the pole the 'multisector model,' and, at the other, the 'sector model.' The real variety of organizational models corresponds to national traditions of co-operativism, as well as to the presence of the 
Mutualist
Maintenance of the democratic principle (one member, one vote) independently of the contribution of each farmer to the total volume of productive activity.
Emphasis on the principle of mutual help and solidarity (to strictly limit the relationship between cooperatives and nonmembers).
Demand for more restrictive legislation to support only those cooperatives that conform to traditional principles.
Promotion of the creation of medium size co-operatives integrated into the local area and oriented to the local market.
Support for the creation of a multi-sector model based on ideological affinities (cooperatives from different sectors gathered together in a unitary federation).
Promotion of joint participation of federations of cooperatives with other local groups in new rural development networks.
Ideological discourses

Entrepreneurial
Allowing farmers more than one vote, depending on their contribution to the total volume of co-operative production.
Emphasis on efficiency and the managerial and profitoriented logic (to remove the limitations on transactions with farmers who are not members)
Demand for more flexible legislation (including the abolition of all legislation to regulate co-operatives) to free them from restrictions imposed by traditional principles.
Promotion of the creation of macro cooperatives oriented towards the filière.
Support for the creation of a plurality of sector and branch-oriented models based on economic affinities (only co-operatives from the same sector or branch gathered in a federation).
Promotion of the participation of federations of cooperatives into interprofessional structures with agrifood companies.
Source: The authors have elaborated the table mutualist or entrepreneurial discourses mentioned above. The institutional framework, designed by states to channel different organized interest groups, is also a very important factor in explaining the organizational panorama of co-operativism. The multisector model is characterized by the existence of large federations, which articulate the interests of co-operatives independently of the particular sector in which they operate. Co-operatives in different sectors (farming, fishing, consumers, health, insurance, housing or teaching) articulate their interests within the same multisector federation, and share a specific ideological discourse and a common history. This model has generally followed the mutualist discourse above, in emphasizing the principle of solidarity to underpin co-operative action in every sector.
In the European Union, Italy is the best representative of the multisector model (Just 1990; Moyano 1993b) , with three large federations divided by ideology (the rossa-left Lega, the bianca-Catholic cic and the lay agci). Within these multisector federations, agricultural co-operatives are organized in the corresponding sector association, with a certain degree of autonomy -for example, within the Lega, agricultural co-operatives form a sector federation called the anca-Lega. The multisector model, however, is unusual in Europe, since it is increasingly difficult to maintain co-operatives with different organizational strategies and logics in a single representative structure. Their growing involvement in market-oriented economic activity is decisive in this trend towards differentiation. In countries where this model still exists, a serious debate has arisen among the leaders of the most important agricultural co-operatives, on the value of continued support for it. Many consider it an old-fashioned and unsuitable model for agricultural co-operatives, particularly for those in the most competitive branches. In order to avoid breaking with a long tradition, in countries such as Denmark, which historically have chosen the multisector model (Bjorn 1988; Knudsen and Vedholm 1988) , agricultural federations have acquired complete autonomy within the umbrella multisectoral federation sda, and have created their own service structures and financial sources.
In the European Union, the sector model is the most developed. It is based on affinity of economic activities, where agricultural co-operatives articulate their interests within a fully independent federation, since a multisector federation is incapable of integrating all co-operatives. The French example is typical, with agricultural co-operatives organized in a single federation, the above mentioned cfca. Other typical examples are the confagri in Portugal, the ncr in the Netherlands, the fac in the United Kingdom and the ccae in Spain.
To some extent, the sector model reflects a high degree of differentiation within the co-operative movement, with co-operatives in different sectors facing increasingly different problems and having to create their own sector model of representation. The existence of a specific umbrella structure in the eu for the sector representation of agricultural co-operatives, the Comité Générale de la Cooperation Agricole (cogeca) both reflects and encourages this process.
Nevertheless, the sector articulation of co-operativism presents important organizational problems, owing to the effects of the general process of internal differentiation within each sector. In the case of agricultural co-operatives, the differences between fruit and vegetable, and oil-processing co-operatives, regarding the regulation of markets, for example, or between livestock and cereal co-operatives, with regard to prices for their products, 8 lead to different claims and different strategies.
There is a trend towards increased internal differentiation in branches within agricultural co-operatives, leading to the dominance of branch-oriented models in the organizational panorama. From a rational choice point of view, agricultural cooperatives are expected to articulate their interests in sector federations together with other co-operatives involved in the same branch of activity, for reasons of efficiency. Rational choice analysts would say that the type of goods, the technology and the market in an economic sector make the branch-oriented model more efficient. However, the reality is that all agricultural co-operatives (independently of the branch in which they develop their activity) form sector federations. An institutionalist approach would see this non-efficient result as the consequence of institutional factors, suggesting that decision-making institutions created by the state at regional, national and European levels act as a counterbalance by imposing a more concentrated system of interest representation. This forces agricultural cooperatives from different branches to remain within the sector federation. In the next section, we will analyze these tendencies, focusing on the situation in Spain, particularly on the establishment of the ccae and its internal articulation.
Co-operativism in Spain
In Spain, the importance of co-operativism is notable. According to 1999 data, the 3,915 agricultural co-operatives had a total turnover of 1.7 billion pesetas, representing an increase of 30 per cent over 1997. The volume of turnover for agricultural co-operatives represents more than a third of Spanish Final Agricultural Production (calculated at 5 billion pesetas for 1999). Its social importance becomes apparent if we consider that the production of 85 per cent of all farms is linked to a cooperative. Data for 1999 show that 1,098,000 farmers were members of either one or several co-operatives.
Agricultural co-operativism in Spain, however, is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and internal heterogeneity, with a predominance of small-scale co-operative models whose sphere of activity does not reach beyond the borders of the area where their head offices are located. Nevertheless, in recent years there has been an intense process of concentration through merging or co-ordinating their strategies to enable them to broaden their sphere of economic activity and meet market demands. Proof of this lies in the steady reduction in the number of agricultural co-operatives over the last 5 years: of the 5,376 co-operatives existing in 1994, only 3,915 remained in 1999. If we use data with reference to sectors and not co- operatives, 9 we find that the marketing sector of agricultural products (see Table  2 ) is most prominent with 3,492 co-operative sections, while in the supply sector there are 1,890 and, in livestock, 702. Table 3 shows the degree of co-operative integration in Spanish agriculture, 10 demonstrating the economic importance of co-operativism in each productive sector. Thus, according to 1999 data, the tobacco sector stands out with 100 per cent of total production managed through cooperatives, followed by the rice sector with 80 per cent, olive oil with 75 per cent and wine with 70 per cent. In the third group we find cotton, with 45 per cent, and milk with 45 per cent. The lowest level of co-operativism is located in the fruit and cereals sectors, each with 35 per cent, and in livestock and vegetables, with 20 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. The tobacco, fruit and vegetable sectors have seen the greatest increase in levels of co-operativism in the last 5 years, owing to incentives set by the cap through the respective Common Market Organizations, to encourage producers to affiliate to co-operatives.
Nevertheless, because of the excessive fragmentation that still exists, the economic importance of co-operativism is limited within the agri-food sector overall. In fact, it is only important in the first stages of commercialization, that is, in the production stage, where it contributes towards concentrating the offer of agricultural products. Many Spanish agricultural co-operatives are restricted to bulk selling of their members' products to large agri-business companies, and are incapable of meeting the challenge of industrial transformation.
Consequently, agricultural co-operativism in Spain can still be said to be more important for its social function than its economic. This importance stems from its wide extension throughout rural society (rare is the municipality that does not have at least one agricultural co-operative) and the large number of farmers who are members. While this could be interpreted as a good indicator of the social capital 11 existing in Spanish rural communities, and as a positive factor for revitalization, it is also an obstacle to the undertaking of larger projects for economic development. Excessive dispersion means that the particular values of each co-operative (whose point of reference is restricted to the area in which it is located) predominate over the universal values that are necessary for these projects to be successful. Thus, in the opinion of the majority of analysts (Entrena and Moyano 1998) , the greatest challenge for Spanish agricultural co-operativism lies in adopting strategies for coordination that transcend the limited local area and allow activities to be carried out on a larger scale to satisfy market demands. In this respect, they consider that the role of federations of co-operatives is decisive, in that, when acting as political actors with the capacity to define the general interests of the co-operative move- ment as a whole, they are able to transcend the limited sphere in which individual co-operatives act and to propose far-reaching strategies for development. As we will show below, the role that the ccae plays as a revitalizing force of Spanish agricultural co-operativism is illustrative of this process.
Historical background
The Agricultural Unions Act of 1906 made possible the creation of the first agricultural associations in Spain. Within the framework of that Act, agricultural associations, called unions or co-operatives indiscriminately, worked very hard to promote the modernization of out of date farming structures. Their activities, according to the particular characteristics of their rank and file and the ideological discourse that inspired them, were also significant in the defense of farmers' interests. The most relevant feature of these early associations was the lack of functional specialization between co-operatives and farmers' unions. Both were involved in economic activities, provided services to farmers, and represented farmers' interests.
Whatever their ideology, the promotion of co-operativism was a common feature. For example, the cnca (National Catholic Agricultural Confederation), the most important farmers' union in the 1920s and 1930s in Spain, saw co-operativism as the best way of improving living conditions in rural areas, and promoted the establishment of many marketing co-operatives, as well as mutual societies and credit banks, aimed at small farmers (Herrero 1975; Castillo 1978; Cuesta 1978) . 12 The socialist fntt-ugt (National Federation of Agricultural Labourers) and the anarchist cnt (National Labour Confederation) encouraged the creation of cooperatives for the collective exploitation of the land, as a way of achieving its collectivist project (Paniagua 1982; Biglino 1986 ). After the Civil War (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) , the assets of co-operatives were seized and union organizations with socialist and anarchist links banned, and Catholic agricultural organizations were integrated into the corporatist structure of Franco's dictatorship (Majuelo y Pascual 1991) .
All farmers were obliged to join Local Brotherhoods and all co-operatives were forced to join utecos (Provincial Associations of Co-operatives), which were recognized by the government as their sole representatives in each province. Although the utecos were multisector associations of co-operatives, the agricultural co-operatives were the most important. At the national level, the utecos were compulsorily integrated into the unaco, the highest corporatist body representing the co-operative movement. Their leaders occupied a prominent place in the most important political institutions of the Francoist regime, alongside representatives of other corporations. The utecos and unaco were involved both in economic activities and in representing their members. The utecos represented all the co-operatives in each province and also played an important role in the marketing of agricultural products, where they acted, in effect, as second tier co-operatives. The unaco, in addition to its representation role, also played an active part in economic matters, acting as a third tier co-operative.
The dual role, economic and representative, of the utecos and unaco had significant consequences, in that the level of their representative function was determined by the relative economic importance of each one of their branches. If, for example, a provincial uteco was mainly involved in activities related to the marketing of olive oil, the interests of co-operatives from that branch were given preference over those of other productive branches. Representatives from these economically dominant branches within the utecos occupied the centres of power and influence. This pattern was repeated at the national level within the unaco, where the interests of olive oil co-operatives were predominant. Representatives of the wine growing or fruit and vegetable branches had no access to national centres of power and influence.
Nevertheless, the modernization of Spanish agriculture during the 1960s and 1970s had significant consequences for the more dynamic branches of the co-operative movement, particularly for those involved in the production of wine, sugar beet, and fruit and vegetables. New market demands led to a clash between their organizational strategies and the traditional strategies of the utecos and unaco. The leaders of these modern branches, therefore, created their own co-ordinating bodies within the old corporatist organization in order to act as pressure groups. Wine growing co-operatives, for example, created a sector association within the unaco, which they called the Unión de Bodegas. Those producing sugar beet co-ordinated their strategies within the organizational structures of the most important co-operative society, the acor (Association of Co-operatives Onésimo Redondo) with more than 100 co-operatives and 10,000 associated farmers. In the fruit and vegetable branch, co-ordination was achieved with the passing of the 1972 Act on Agricultural Producers' Groups (apas), based on the French model of groupements de producteurs. In order to gain official recognition as apas, co-operatives had to show a high rate of production within the corresponding branch, to have a large number of member farmers, and to implement programmes to regulate production. The fruit and vegetable co-operatives alone were able to satisfy the apas' requirements, which gave them an identity as a distinctive group. In brief, at the end of the Franco period, agricultural co-operativism in Spain was already deeply differentiated, with the advance of modernization and the integration of the farming sector into the market. In this context, ideals of unity and mutualism became merely rhetorical, as co-operatives were increasingly oriented toward the market and the logic of profitability.
The democratic reform of the old corporatist structures
With the restoration of democracy, a law passed in 1977 allowed farmers and cooperatives to join voluntary associations (Moyano 1993 ), but did not remove the old corporatist structures. The utecos and unaco continued to be the main channels of representation for many co-operatives, particularly those in olive production, whose representatives continued to occupy the centres of power and influence.
However, the leaders of the more dynamic and modern wine-growing, sugar beet, and fruit and vegetable sectors, mentioned earlier, took advantage of the new legislation to create their own independent organizations. Fruit and vegetable cooperatives, previously recognized as groupements de producteurs (apas), created an independent federation, the feapa (Spanish Federation of Agricultural Producers Groups). Wine-growing co-operatives, on the other hand, legalized their former association, the Unión de Bodegas. In some regions, such as Catalonia, Navarra and Valencia, federations of co-operatives were created to enable them to participate in the new regional decision-making institutions, established within the framework of political decentralization that began with the 1978 Constitution. These three projects had in common the adoption of a sector model aimed exclusively at agri-cultural co-operatives, which reflected the high level of internal differentiation in the co-operative movement. They also shared an entrepreneurial ideology, in line with the high degree of modernization in the three agricultural branches. Consequently, the mutualist discourse and options in favour of multisector models were of minor importance. 13 In this context, the tendency toward pluralism and diversity that could be explained by the need for efficiency, counteracted political factors that favoured unity through the maintenance of the old corporatist institutions.
The establishment of the ccae (Spanish Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives)
Two important political factors encouraged the creation of a unitary sector federation. These were the entry of Spain, in 1986, into the European Union, which enabled the Spanish co-operative movement to be represented in Brussels in the cogeca, and the passing of the General Co-operatives Act of 1987, which created new umbrella institutions to represent the co-operative movement at the national level. The establishment of the ccae as a national federation of agricultural co-operatives was, however, not an easy process.
Initially, two sector federations of co-operatives were created, the aeca (Spanish Association of Agricultural Co-operatives) and the ucae (Union of Spanish Agricultural Co-operatives), which reflected important political and organizational differences in the farming sector. The aeca had been promoted by left-wing groups close to the Socialist Party (psoe), which proposed a sector federation based on large branch associations, according to the model existing in the wine and fruit and vegetable branches. The ucae, which had been promoted by the traditional elite, particularly by leaders linked to the olive branch in the old Francoist corporatist structures, proposed a sector federation based on regional associations, like that of the old unaco, rather than on branches.
Immediately after the entry of Spain into the European Union, the Ministry of Agriculture was interested in promoting a unitary sector federation in order that agricultural co-operatives could be represented in the cogeca in Brussels. That is why the Ministry of Agriculture worked hard to bring the aeca and ucae together. In 1989, these two federations merged to form the ccae, which was recognized by the government as the sole representative of agricultural co-operatives in Spain, and also represented them in the cogeca. 14 
The ideology and organizational model of the ccae
The ccae is a federation of agricultural co-operatives in which the entrepreneurial discourse is dominant. 15 The best indicator of the dominance of this discourse is the attitude of the ccae towards recent reform of co-operative legislation, at both the national and regional level.
In fact, many aspects of the Co-operatives Act of 1999, which replaces the abovementioned Act of 1987, are in line with this entrepreneurial discourse and can be interpreted as the result of ccae demands. The reform of the classic democratic principle of 'one member, one vote,' which allows for a member of a co-operative to have up to a maximum of five votes according to his contribution to the total volume of co-operative production, is an example. The reform of the traditional Federations of Co-operatives mutualist principle, removing limitations on transactions between co-operatives and farmers who are not members, is also in line with the ccae's entrepreneurial discourse. With regard to economic co-operation, the ccae promotes the constitution of macro models based on second-tier co-operatives, and their integration with the agri-food industry (agri-business enterprises) into inter-professional structures, in order to resolve the problem, mentioned above, of extreme fragmentation and to make them more competitive.
In its organization, the ccae comprises seventeen regional associations of agricultural co-operatives, with a single association representing co-operatives in each region. 16 Within the framework of this territorial model, however, co-operatives with common activities in the same branch (those, for example, in wine-growing, olive oil, cereal growing, livestock, or fruit and vegetable production) are allowed to organize themselves in relatively autonomous associations. 17 This territorial model is reflected in the management structure of the ccae. The general assembly is drawn from members of the management committees of the seventeen regional associations and representatives from branch associations. The latter, however, have no voting rights. The management board consists of the president, vice-president and secretary of the ccae, who are elected from the representatives of regional associations, and a representative from each of these regional associations. The branch associations are not represented.
The dominance within the ccae of the entrepreneurial discourse, which reflects the high degree of modernization and internal differentiation in the Spanish agricultural co-operative movement, would lead one to expect the more efficient branchoriented model. In reality, however, it is based on a federation of regional associations, in which the branch-oriented associations are subordinate.
This can be explained by institutional factors outside the domain of agriculture. Political decentralization, with regional governments having the power to regulate co-operatives, and the consequent creation of decision-making institutions at the regional level, have counteracted internal tendencies towards diversity and differentiation in branch-oriented associations. 18 This has introduced a logic of interest concentration, with the creation of regional associations of agricultural co-operatives, which have imposed a territorial model on the ccae's organizational structure.
The existence of the cogeca in Brussels, as an umbrella institution for national federations of agricultural co-operatives, has also had an important effect in encouraging territorial models at the expense of branch-oriented models. Only co-operatives belonging to national federations on the cogeca are represented in the agricultural committees in Brussels, which are consulted by the European Commission before the final approval of cap regulations. Agricultural co-operatives from different branches, therefore, are compelled to integrate into territorial structures if they wish to participate in eu decision-making institutions.
Conclusions
Federations of agricultural co-operatives are claim-oriented associations. Their goals are integral, and they offer public goods. Their strategies are based on ideological discourses, which reflect deep differences in the co-operative movement. There is, on the one hand, a 'mutualist discourse,' emphasizing traditional co-operative prin-ciples of democratic participation and solidarity and mutual help, and, on the other, an 'entrepreneurial discourse' that proposes the introduction of an enterprise-oriented logic to enable co-operatives to become more competitive in the open market.
Each discourse is related to different organizational models. The mutualist discourse, based on ideological affinities, encourages multisector models, with co-operatives from different sectors gathered together in single federations. Entrepreneurial discourse, on the other hand, encourages the sector model, based on economic affinities. In the European Union, where the entrepreneurial discourse is dominant, co-operatives are usually organized into sector federations, and agricultural co-operatives are represented independently by their own national federations. Through the cogeca they participate in European Union decision-making processes, particularly through the agricultural committees which are consulted by the European Commission.
Even within agricultural co-operativism there is an internal tendency towards the differentiation of co-operatives into branch-oriented federations, and their integration with agri-food companies in inter-professional structures, in line with the current level of integration of co-operatives in the market and the dominance of an entrepreneurial discourse, with an economic rationale. This can be explained using efficiency factors based on a rational choice approach: in increasingly specialized markets, where agricultural co-operatives will have the same interests as other cooperatives in the same branch and other economic actors in the corresponding filière, they might be expected to form branch-oriented associations.
Empirical analysis shows, however, that agricultural co-operatives form territorial associations where branch-oriented interests are subordinated. In this paper, we have analyzed the Spanish experience, where there is a unitary federation of agricultural co-operatives, the ccae, whose organizational model is based on regional associations bringing together agricultural co-operatives operating in different branches.
A rational choice approach, therefore, is not sufficient to explain this panorama, since the establishment of the ccae cannot be seen as the result of efficiency factors, which reduce the transaction cost between agricultural co-operatives. It is also necessary to introduce the role of institutional design, in line with the two neoinstitutionalist approaches (rational choice and sociological). Spanish agricultural co-operatives are collective actors, which form federations to represent their interests. In the context of the dominance of the entrepreneurial discourse, it would be rational for them to join other co-operatives in the same sector and branch, thus making branch-oriented federations the dominant organizational model. The presence of state institutional frameworks, however, counteracts the internal tendency toward differentiation. In conclusion, when forming federations to represent their interests, agricultural co-operatives define their preferences freely, but within a restricted range of options, conditioned by the existence of institutional frameworks at the regional, national and eu levels.
Notes
Jan Treacher has translated the Spanish version of this paper into English. 1. The wide bibliography that exists on agricultural co-operatives can be seen in specialized journals, such as The Journal of Rural Cooperation and The Journal of Agricultural Cooperation. The association ciriec publishes a periodical, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (Blackwell), with interesting articles on co-operatives, but very little on their fed-
